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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The weight of authority seems clearly against inquiring into
the validity of a foreign decree when its effect is intraterritorial.
However, the Court in the instant case chose to depart from this
view. As a practical matter, the wisdom of the instant decision
is doubtful in view of the problems to which it gives rise.2 1
LABOR LAw - APPORTIONMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
COSTS-No AUTHORIZATION OF UNION'S POLITICAL SPENDING
OVER MEMBER'S OBJECTION.- Nonunion employees filed to enjoin
the enforcement of a union-shop contract entered into by appellant
union and the employer railroad under Section 2, Eleventh of the
Railway Labor Act.' Union-shop agreements provide for union
membership as a condition to continued employment. The em-
ployees alleged that since the union policy was to spend a substantial
portion of the dues collected for political causes which they opposed,
so much of the Railway Labor Act as authorized union shops was
violative of first amendment freedoms regarding association and
belief. The Supreme Court of Georgia sustained this contention
and the union appealed. Refusing to consider the constitutional
question, the United States Supreme Court held that the sole
purpose of section 2, Eleventh was to apportion collective bargaining
costs among all the benefiting employees, and since political spending
is not an element of collective bargaining, dues collected cannot
be spent for political causes over the objection of a member.
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
According to the union-shop provision of section 2, Eleventh
a union and employer are permitted to agree, notwithstanding state
"right to work" laws, that union membership be a condition of
continued employment, provided that the nonpayment of periodic
dues, initiation fees and assessments shall be the only reason for
refusing or revoking membership. 2
The constitutionality of such agreements was first tested in
Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, which involved an action
executive has not indicated its position on a certain matter or if it were
to change its view regarding a particular situation?
27 Notice of Appeal has been filed in the instant case and it is to be
argued before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
during the current term.
'Railway Labor Act § 2, Eleventh, 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152,
Eleventh (1958).
2 Ibid.
3351 U.S. 225 (1956).
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by several employees of a railroad against the employer and union
to enjoin enforcement of a union-shop agreement prior to its taking
effect. Plaintiffs offered two arguments: First, they relied on
the fifth amendment's protection of property rights and a state
"right to work" law.4  The employees contended they were not,
and had no desire to become, union members; and that if they
did not join within a sixty day period they would not be permitted
to continue in their present employment. Therefore, they must
either sacrifice accrued seniority, retirement and pension benefits,
or pay the periodic costs of union membership. In rejecting this
argument the Supreme Court said that it was within the power
of Congress to regulate labor relations within interstate industries,
and the choice of permissive union-shop agreements as a method
of regulation was not a violation of fifth amendment property
rights.5 The Court then went on to dispose of the plaintiffs'
second contention, which was that since the union involved engaged
in political activities which they opposed, "compulsory membership
will be used to impair freedom of expression [as guaranteed by
the first amendment] .... The Court stated: "But that problem
is not presented by this record." 
Thus, the issues passed on in the Hanson case were limited to
the questions of deprivation of property and conflict with state
"right to work" laws. An investigation of legislative intent had
led the Court to conclude that the purpose of section 2, Eleventh
was to require those who benefit from collective bargaining agree-
ments to share the cost of collective bargaining.8 In declaring
union-shop contracts constitutional the Court was careful to confine
itself to the facts represented, 9 and although the same first amend-
4 NEB. CoNsT. art. XV, § 13, contains a typical "right to work" pro-
vision: "No person shall be denied employment because of membership
in ... or because of refusal to join .. . a labor organization; nor shall
any individual . .. enter into any contract .. . to exclude persons from
employment because of membership in or nonmembership in a labor
organization."
sRailway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, supra note 3, at 233.
s Id. at 238.
7Ibid.
S "Benefits resulting from collective bargaining may not be withheld
from employees because they are not members of the union." International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 762, quoting H.R. EP. No. 2811,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
"As Senator Hill, who managed the bill on the floor of the Senate,
said, 'The question in this instance is whether those who enjoy the fruits
and benefits of the unions should make a fair contribution to the support
of the union.'" Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231(1956), quoting 96 CoNG. Rw. 16279 (1951) (remarks of Senator Hill).
9 "We only hold that the requirements for financial support of -the
collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work is
within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause and does not
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ment objections which are presented in the instant case were also
raised in Hanson, the Court then, as now, refused to consider
them.
In practice, the first amendment is not interpreted as con-
ferring an absolute immunity for every possible use of language.
Thus, when the public interest has been a consideration, statutory
measures limiting individual and group rights to free expression
have frequently been held not to be in violation of constitutional
guarantees.10
The Federal Corrupt Practices Act I" presents a good illus-
tration. Congress recognized the need for restraints regarding
political spending by unions, which at the time was threatening
the purity of free elections through "the misuse of aggregated funds
gathered into the control, of a single organization from many
individual sources." 12 Broadly drawn, the act outlaws, on its face,
all union contributions or expenditures in connection with elections
to federal office. 13 But as is often the case with broad legislation,
several exceptions to the general prohibition developed.' 4  One
of the more notable of these exceptions is represented by United
States v. CIO, which held that it was not an offense under the
Corrupt Practices Act for a union financing and publishing a
periodical for circulation among its members to include in that
publication political comments supporting various federal can-
didates.15 As in both the principal case and the Hanson case, the
argument was urged that the legislation was an unreasonable inter-
ference with the right to free speech, 6 and also as in those cases,
the Court chose a statutory interpretation which avoided the need
to pass on that question.
The impact of the CIO decision on union political activity
was significant. It served to severely qualify the broad restrictions
on political spending ostensibly imposed on unions by the act,
and further proved the foundation for future judicial acquiescence
violate either the First or the Fifth Amendments." Railway Employes' Dep't
v. Hanson, supra note 8, at 238.
10 See, e.g., Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882), which held con-
stitutional a congressional act providing that federal employees are prohibited
from giving to or requesting from other federal employees political con-
tributions. The Court grounded its position on the aims of the act, which
were to uphold efficiency and integrity in public service and maintain proper
discipline without undue influence. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204,
206 (1919).
1143 Stat. 1070, 1074 (1925), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §610 (1958).
12 United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 122 (1948).
13 Also included are prohibitions covering primary elections, political con-
ventions and caucuses. See note 11 supra.
14 See note 17 infra.
15 United States v. CIO, supra note 12, at 123-24.
6 Id. at 109.
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to many union political activities which might well have been
previously construed to fall within the act's prohibitions 17  Further,
the case had presented to the Court an opportunity to decide the
constitutionality of legislation tending to impair first amendment
guarantees regarding political expression. For their refusal to pass
on that question the Court was accused of "rewriting or emasculating
the statute .... ", 1s
In the instant case this same objection to the majority position
is again raised. Although disagreeing among themselves as to the
ultimate answer, dissenting Justices Black and Frankfurter take
sharp issue with the majority's reluctance to squarely face a
constitutional issue laid before the Court. Thus, Justice Black
comments:
I think the Court is once more "carrying the doctrine of avoiding con-
stitutional questions to a wholly unjustifiable extreme." In fact, I think
the Court is actually rewriting § 2, Eleventh to make it mean exactly what
Congress refused to make it mean.' 9
His position is that there exists no indication Congress wished
to limitthe purpose for which the dues it authorized to be collected
under union-shop agreements might be spent. Justice Frankfurter
agrees with this latter interpretation of congressional intent, but
at that point agreement ends. Whereas Justice Black concludes
that because section 2, Eleventh authorizes political spending it is
an infringement on dissenters' rights under the first amendment,2 0
Justice Frankfurter asserts that such expenditures are constitutional.2'
Both admit to the close historical relationship between unionism
and politics and both refuse to accept, as the majority maintains,
that Congress, presumably also aware of this undeniable association,
would think to separate the two without bothering to expressly
provide for such a separation.2 2
17See United States v. Teamsters Union Local 688, 41 CCH Lab. Cas.
ff 16,601 (E.D. Mo. 1960), which held that in view of the Supreme Court's
attitude in United States v. CIO, contributions or expenditures by a union
in connection with the election of federal candidates are lawful if from
funds voluntarily designated for such use, with the consent of the union's
officers, and providing an accounting is made available to all members.
United States v. Painters Local 481, 172 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949), determined
certain union political expenditures to be outside the Corrupt Practices Act's
prohibitions, thereby reversing a district court which had presumed to
pass on the Act's constitutionality.
's United States v. CIO, supra note 12, at 130 (Justice Rutledge, con-
curring).
19International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 784 (1961)(dissenting opinion).2 0 Id. at 791.2
'Id. at 818.22 Id. at 785-86 (Justice Black), 800-01, 803 (Justice Frankfurter).
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In pressing further their criticism of the majority ratio
decidendi reference is made to the following caveat in Hanson:
The financial support required [from plaintiff employees] relates . . .
to the work of the union in the realm of collective bargaining. . . . If
"assessments" are in fact imposed for purposes not germane to collective
bargaining, a different problem would be presented.23
Although this "different problem" is exactly the one raised by
plaintiffs in the instant case, the Court has again avoided coming
to grips with the question of first amendment infringements. Con-
sequently, the Court may expect in the future, so the dissenters
argue, to be faced with a record so clearly documented that it
will not be able to avoid, as it does today, passing on first
amendment objections to section 2, Eleventh.24
This observation is not without merit. In the present case
the complaining employees argued as follows: The union actively
supports political programs they oppose; section 2, Eleventh
authorizes contracts between union and employer which make union
membership a condition of continued employment; therefore, section
2, Eleventh violates the employees' rights of freedom of association
and thought by requiring them to support union ideologies and
political doctrines against their will.2 5 When applied to -the facts
presented and combined with a realistic view of traditional union
collective bargaining weapons, this syllogism would clearly seem
to establish a proper and necessary reason for passing on the
constitutional issue involved.
26
By sidestepping, the instant holding engenders many potential
issues which might have been avoided through a decision which
more squarely met the argument presented. Most conservatively
construed, the Court has merely said that a union operating under
a Railway Labor Act union-shop agreement 'is not authorized to
-spend "substantial amounts" 27 for political purposes over the objec-
tion of its members.
23 Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 235 (1956).
24 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, supra note 19, at 785 (jus-
tice Black), 799-800 (justice Frankfurter).2 5 1d. at 744-45.
26 The majority itself admits the record is sufficient to justify passing
on the constitutional question raised. Id. at 749.
27 Id. at 744 n.2. The trial court found that plaintiffs' dues were being
used in "substantial amounts." Ibid. It is interesting to note the following
stipulation of facts entered into between the parties: "19. The periodic
dues, fees and assessments which plaintiffs . . . will be required to pay
under the terms of the union shop agreement . . . have been, are being,
and will be used in substantial part for Punrposes other than the negotiation,
maintenance, and administration of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules
and working conditions, or wages, hours, terms and other conditions of
employment, or the handling of disputes relating to the above, but to
[ VOL. 36
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Presumably, the same reasoning which led the Court to decide
that political purposes were not included within the meaning of
section 2, Eleventh as an element of collective bargaining, would
also be valid to support objections to other forms of union ex-
penditure, such as philanthropic donations, resort centers, pension
funds, and so on. Unfortunately, the Court has made no attempt
to define, other than by exclusion, what pursuits it considers to
be in the line of collective bargaining.
First and fifth amendment objections, i. e., speech and prop-
erty infringements, were raised in the instant, Hanson, and CIO
cases. Although in all three the Court avoided dealing with the
free speech question it showed little hesitancy in upholding the
legislation involved over alleged property infringements. In view
of this judicial approach, it might be speculated that those union
spending activities, which represent conflicts with property rights
only, stand a good chance of being determined proper collective
bargaining expenses; whereas those union activities which conflict
in equal degree with the first rather than the fifth amendment
are more apt to be disallowed as to those members who oppose such
spending.
The instant case also presents problems of definition. What
may the unions expect to be considered a "political activity" within
the meaning of the congressional exclusion? 28 Where does in-
stitutional advertising or philanthropic donation end and political
campaigning begin? What distinguishes legal representation before
Congress from lobbying? And, is the publication in union news-
papers of party platforms, without comment, to be considered
political or educational? If the present holding means no political
expenditures, may unions expect a de minimis rule to develop?
On the other band, if the holding is confined to the facts and only
substantial political expenditures are to be subject to objection,
may the Court be expected in the future to establish a test for
dealing with the difficult questions of fact which will arise?
Further, how will the courts face the problem of locals who
do not engage in political spending themselves but who contribute
to nationals and internationals who do?
It should also be remembered that the CIO case, which
authorized a degree of political activity by a union, involved the
Corrupt Practices Act and not section 2, Eleventh. That is,
support ideological and political doctrines and candidates which plaintiffs ...
and the class represented by them, were, are, and will be opposed to and
not willing to support voluntarily." International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 215 Ga. 27, 31, 108 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1959).
28 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 770, 775
(1961). The Court is no more specific than "political activities," "political
causes" and "political purposes."
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there was no question of objection by employees who were forced
to support that periodical through union-shop agreements. In
predicting the courts' attitude regarding union political activities
it will be necessary to keep in mind that specific expenditures
will first be subject to the Corrupt Practices Act test and then,
where applicable, to section 2, Eleventh limitations as well.
It seems reasonable to assume that the same considerations
motivate all union-shop agreements, whether or not authorized under
the Railway Labor Act-the argument being that he who benefits
should share the burden of achieving the benefit. Therefore, there
does not appear to be any substantial reason why the instant holding
should not apply to union-shop contracts not covered by the Rail-
way Labor Act but provided for by other state or federal legisla-
tion. For example, the Taft-Hartley Act also authorizes union-
shop agreements, although, it does not demand, as the Railway
Labor Act does, that they be permitted in states having "right
to work" laws.2 9  Thus, if Taft-Hartley union shops are to be
covered, it would seem to follow that agency-shop agreements should
also be included, since from the employee's point of view they
come to the same thing.30
The only apparent way to avoid these logical extensions is to
maintain that the definition of collective bargaining differs from
act to act, a tenuous position to defend. That the instant case
extends the effect of previous limitations on union political activities
cannot be doubted-the critical question is how far.
The quasi-public aspect of many unions l is ample reason
for legislation such as the Corrupt Practices Act. Conversely,
the necessity for protecting union first amendment rights may
justify judicial interpretations of such legislation in a manner il-
lustrated by United States v. CIO. But what of the individual
union member who, practically speaking, is forced to join and
contribute to such union political activities?
The conflicting juridical attitudes of a significant number of
justices precludes resolution of the many speculations prompted
2"Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 164(b) (1958).
30 An agency-shop agreement is one in which all employees of the class
represented by the certified union, whether members or not, are required to
pay a sum equal to union dues as their share of collective bargaining costs.
American Seating Co. v. Pattern Makers League, 98 N.L.R.B. 800, 801
(1952).
31 See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 197-98 (1944), which
held that a union bargaining under the union-shop provision of section 2,
Eleventh speaks for all the members of its class, nonmembers as well, and
therefore has a duty to fairly represent them. American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), implying that a union's private character
is changed by virtue of government protections. Kabn-Freund, Trade Union
Democracy and the Law, 22 Oio ST. L.J. 4, 7 (1961).
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by the present holding. It may at least be said that the decision
represents an indirect revitalization of the Corrupt Practices Act
philosophy of restricting union rights in the use of their funds
for political campaigning, perhaps made necessary by the some-
what sterilizing effect on the act of the CIO holding. Now, a
union member under a Railway Labor Act union-shop agreement
has the right that his dues not be relegated to support a political
activity to which he is opposed, regardless of whether or not the
Corrupt Practices Act prohibits that activity.
Although the reasoning advanced by the majority does not
directly face the fundamental issue of to what extent the individual's
first amendment guarantees are a bondslave to the union's need
of financial support for collective bargaining, the Court has none-
theless evidenced a concern, albeit indirectly, lest political freedom
be made overly subservient to general group welfare under the
guise of sharing the cost burden.
M
TAXATION - SCOPE OF THE MEDicAL DEDUCTION.-- A tax-
payer, who was suffering from a heart disease, was advised to take
a trip to Florida for the winter months by his physician. The
taxpayer claimed the hotel lodging expenses for himself and his
wife and child as "medical deductions." The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit upheld this claim. On the other hand, a
taxpayer in the Second Circuit, who had been advised by his
physician to take a trip to Bermuda, following major abdominal
surgery, had his claim for deduction of lodgings for himself and
his wife denied by the Court of Appeals. Both circuits, however,
agreed that the costs of the transportation to Florida and Bermuda
were allowable "medical deductions." Commissioner v. Bilder, 289
F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3154
(U.S. Nov. 13, 1961) (No. 384); Carasso v. Commissioner,
292 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1961).
Both the 1939 and the 1954 Internal Revenue Codes made
provisions for the allowances of "medical expenses" as deductions
from gross income.1  Section 24(a) (1) of the 1939 Internal
SInt. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(x), added by ch. 619, § 127, 56 Stat. 825
(1942), as amended, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 24(a) (1), 53 Stat.
16 (1939), as amended, ch. 619, § 127, 56 Stat. 826 (1942) [hereinafter cited
as 1939 Code]. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 213 [hereinafter cited as 1954
CODE].
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